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Abstract. There is a conflict in the mechanism for price determination used in
a Marshallian partial equilibrium supply and demand framework and the Walrasian
general equilibrium framework. It is generally thought that partial equilibrium is a
simplified approximation to the complexities of the general model. The goal of this
paper is to show that there is a strong conflict between the two models – intuitions and
heuristics suggested by partial equilibrium are contradicted by extensions to the general
equilibrium case. We review the literature on the conflict and also provide a very simple
model where partial equilibrium analysis fails completely. Several intuitively plausible
remedies fail to restore partial equilibrium results. We show that Marshallian analysis
can be made to work only under rather stringent conditions requiring joint production
with low fixed costs and decreasing returns resulting in identical production proportions
by all producers.
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Introduction
Today most economic analysis as well as the majority of elementary textbooks explain
price determinations via the partial equilibrium method, which gained its distinction
with the publication of the first edition of Principles of Economics in 1890 by Alfred
Marshall. It is widely believed that this is a pedagogically convenient simplification
in harmony with the deeper and more complex general equilibrium analysis, first pro-
posed by Leon Walras in his Elements of Pure Economics (1874). However, Piero
Sraffa in two seminal papers, one published in 1925 in Annali and the other in 1926
in Economic Journal showed that a critical condition for perfect competition is vio-
lated if production costs (and consequently economic returns) change with output. In
a diminishing returns industry using only a part of a factor of production that is in
limited supply, an expansion in the output increases the price of this particular factor,
this will impact on all industries using the same factor as input in their production.
Sraffa (1926: 539) argued that “since commodities using a common special factor of
production are often substitutes for one another (for example, various kinds of agricul-
tural produce), the modification in their price will not be without appreciable effects
upon demand in the industry concerned.” This means that the supply and demand
curves cannot be conveniently separated and studied in isolation, as is required for
a Marshallian analysis. The goal of this paper is to show, via a simple model, that
this incompatibility is fundamental, and cannot be easily removed. Thus, Marshallian
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supply and demand analysis can only be an exceptional special case, and price determi-
nation in typical markets cannot be analyzed via partial equilibrium analysis. Below,
we first provide some historical background of the debate regarding partial equilibrium
analysis introduced by Marshall.
Sraffa’s analysis shows that the conditions of perfect conditions assumed as neces-
sary background for Marshall’s partial equilibrium require very special types of cost
structures within an industry. Incompatibility with perfect competition can occur un-
der increasing returns resulting from internal or external economies. Internal economies
due to an increase in the scale of production lead to a monopolistic industry. Monop-
olies violate the price taking behavior assumed for derivation of a supply curve in
the Marshallian analysis. Similarly, external economies due to the general economic
progress are unlikely to result from a small increase in the scale of output of a single
industry, hence they are inconsistent with a stable supply curve in a partial equilib-
rium. Thus, environments that are compatible with partial equilibrium analysis under
increasing returns only involve a thin class of economies that are “external from the
point of view of the individual firm, but internal as regards the industry in its ag-
gregate” (Sraffa 1926: 540). On the other hand, under diminishing returns partial
equilibrium analysis will be valid only for those commodities in the production of
which the whole of a factor is used. If a factor of production is shared with other
industries, then changes in its cost will impact on supply of alternatives, and hence on
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the demand, as argued earlier. Given these extremely restrictive results, Sraffa argued
that “the supply schedule with variable costs cannot claim to be a general conception
applicable to normal industries” (Sraffa 1926: 540) and “in normal cases the cost of
production of commodities produced competitively [...] must be regarded as constant
in respect of small variations in the quantity produced” (Sraffa 1926: 541).
This conclusion of Sraffa that constant costs define the whole set of relevant environ-
ments compatible with Marshallian competitive equilibrium was criticized by Samuel-
son (1987: 458-9) on the basis that it was produced by an ideological bias towards the
classical cost-based price theories where demand plays no role. But, Sraffa (1926) did
not deny the possibility of industries with non-constant supply curves and proposed
two remedies for the problems with Marshallian analysis, one in terms of a simulta-
neous determination of interdependent prices in a general equilibrium system and the
other in terms of the monopolistic competition.
The controversy generated by Sraffa’s critique reached a peak during the Sympo-
sium on Increasing Returns and the Representative Firm published in March 1930 by
the Economic Journal, where he concluded his reactions to the criticisms of Dennis
Robertson to his earlier paper in 1926 by saying that “in the circumstances, I think
it is Marshall’s theory that should be discarded” (Sraffa 1930: 93). Consistent with
this extreme view, which was found to be “negative and destructive” by Keynes in his
Editorial opening of the Symposium, Sraffa ignored the route on monopolistic com-
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petition he proposed to correct Marshallian equilibrium analysis.3 Indeed, after his
Economic Journal (1926) article, Sraffa was mostly interested in constructing a gen-
eral equilibrium analysis of competitive markets and eventually published in 1960 his
Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities, in which he studied - using the
classical approach of Ricardo - the problems of value and distribution as well as issues
such as joint production and switch in methods of production.
While some Cambridge economists, including Dennis Robertson and Gerald Shove
were highly critical of Sraffa’s early contribution, Arthur Pigou soon came to agree with
one of the conclusions of Sraffa (1926) by arguing that “it is impossible for production
anywhere to take place under conditions of increasing costs” (Pigou 1927: 193). How-
ever, Pigou did not assume away the possibility of external economies; thus according
to him “only the laws of constant or decreasing supply price, as so conceived, are ad-
missible” (Pigou 1928: 256). Consequently, he assumed an industry supply curve in
the form of a rectangular hyperbola. Studying the same problem, Viner (1931) allowed
for the possibility of positively sloped industry supply curves and U-shaped industry
average cost curves, by assuming external economies as well as diseconomies pecuniary
3Shortly after Sraffa’s (1926) proposal, this route of research was pursued by two American
economists Edward Chamberlin, who is known to be influenced by the early work of Arthur Pigou,
and Robert Triffin as well as a young generation of Cambridge economists including Austin Robinson,
Joan Robinson, and Richard Kahn, among many others.
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to the changes in the prices of services and materials. He also distinguished between
short-run and long-run in developing the cost function of a single firm.
Sraffa showed that only special kinds of industry cost structures are compatible
with perfect competition and Marshallian supply and demand. The constant costs
required create the problem that aggregate supply by the industry as well as firm size
become indeterminate, as noted by Pigou (1928) and Viner (1931). Austin Robin-
son’s coordination failure model and the factor proportions model of Joan Robinson
provided potential solutions to these problems. Austin Robinson (1931) suggested
that diseconomies of scale caused by managerial, marketing, and risk and fluctuation
forces would determine an optimal firm size beyond which firms would not grow. Joan
Robinson (1941) showed that individual firms facing infinitely elastic supplies of inputs
would have constant returns to scale, while diseconomies would arise at the level of the
industry when aggregate supplies of inputs were imperfectly elastic. This potentially
allows for a determinate aggregate supply function for the industry as a whole.
A milestone in this route of research is Stigler’s (1942) textbook entitled The The-
ory of Competitive Price that integrated the previous works of Viner, Austin Robinson
and Joan Robinson, constructing a new Marshallian theory of cost and supply curves.
Among his several contributions to the price theory, Stigler (1942) distinguished be-
tween the short-run and long-run in which the size of the plant is fixed and variable
respectively and showed that the long-run cost curves can be obtained as an enve-
6
lope of the short-run cost curves. Since Stigler (1942) assumed - like Viner (1931) -
that the short-run cost curves are U-shaped, he found - using the coordination failure
argument of Austin Robinson (1931) - that the induced long-run cost curves for the
firm are also U-shaped. Studying the equilibrium of a competitive industry, Stigler
(1942) then proposed that a firm would be able to operate in the long run only if it
produced an output consistent with the minimum point on its long-run cost curve.
Like Viner (1931), he assumed for the firm an upward-sloping short-run marginal cost
curve, inducing an upward-sloping supply curve, and argued that scale diseconomies
or coordination failure would not lead to rising industry costs, which according to
him could only arise due to an expansion of the industry by the entry of new firms.
Assuming that factors of production used by the industry are heterogenous and then
using the factor proportions argument of Joan Robinson (1941), Stigler (1942) further
proposed that such an expansion in the number of firms would result in diseconomies,
leading to rising industry costs and supply curves.
A prompt challenge to this new theory “was developed during the 1930s by London
School of Economics (LSE) scholars, such as Robbins, Kaldor, Hicks, and Allen, and
was later refined by Samuelson” (Steedman 2008: 247). This challenge determined
output of a commodity only as a function of its price assuming all other prices constant,
opposing the earlier definition of the supply curve in the Marshallian tradition where
“a movement along the supply curve involves a change in many economic variables,
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such as input prices and other product prices” (Opocher and Steedman 2008a: 247).
Thus, the supply curve of an individual firm was defined in the LSE approach as a
symmetric counterpart of the Marshallian demand curve of an individual consumer.
On the other hand, the industry supply curve was obtained by the aggregation of
individual firm supply curves. While the LSE approach led to the conventional short-
run supply curves of the firm we see in current microeconomics textbooks, it did not
solve the main problems in the Marshallian tradition, such as the indeterminacy of
long-run equilibrium, the incoherence of comparative statics in long-run equilibrium,
and the presence of supply-side interdependencies via changes in factor prices when
the industry expands due to entry of new firms.
After the perceived perfection of the competition theory by Stigler’s (1942) synthe-
sis, Sraffian (or neo-Ricardian) economists at Cambridge, England involved in 1950s
and 1960s in a (Cambridge) capital controversy with neoclassical economists at (MIT)
Cambridge, Massachusetts as to the nature of capital as a means of production in the
aggregate production function. While MIT economists claimed that capital can move
as an input seeking the highest return from one production technique to another in
a competitive market, economists in the other side of the Atlantic argued against it
using the re-switching argument of Sraffa (1960) that a production technique may be
cost minimizing for both low and high rates of profits. Although this controversy has
never been settled, ”when theories of endogenous growth and real business cycles took
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off in the 1980s using aggregate production functions, contributors usually wrote as
if the controversies had never occurred and the Cambridge, England contributors had
never existed” (Cohen and Harcourt, 2003). Absolutely, the same criticism can also be
made of Stigler’s (1942) synthesis of perfect competition theory, a significant part of
which has been in use for the last 70 years. The reason is that this synthesis “fails to
respond to Sraffa’s criticism: It makes the demand for and the supply of industry out-
put interdependent” (Aslanbeigui and Naples 1997: 528), since upward sloping supply
curves could arise only if the supplies of inputs were imperfectly elastic, implying that
an increase in the demand for a commodity could not be met with decreased supply
of other commodities in the economy.
Despite economists’ general ignorance of Sraffian challenge to the Marshallian com-
petitive analysis, a number of studies have in the last three decades attempted to revive
the debate. Importantly, a partial equilibrium model studied by Steedman (1988: 95)
showed that “the interdependence between industries which is implied by the existence
of produced means of production, which was so strongly emphasised by Sraffa in 1960,
is quite sufficient to produce ‘collateral effects’ which undermine the results of partial
analysis.” In a related study, Ozanne (1996), using simulations based on an economet-
ric model of UK agriculture between 1978-1982, showed that the existence of produced
inputs in the production process may yield, due to the implied collateral effects, in-
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dustry supply curves that are downward sloping.4 In the same literature, Opocher
and Steedman (2008b), using a theoretical model, established that whether a long-run
industry supply curve is upward or downward sloping depends on the nume´raire in
terms of which the price of the output is measured.
While most of the related literature since Sraffa (1925, 1926) has focused on the
incompatibility of Marshallian supply curves and general equilibrium supply curves
under perfect competition, a recent strand of papers, involving Vives (1987, 1999),
Miyake (2006), and Hayashi (2009), studied the conditions for the set of commodities
or utility functions under which a Marshallian demand function is well behaved and
the partial equilibrium analysis is applicable.
Pursuing the same issue of applicability from a similar angle, we consider in our
4The pioneers of a handful of empirical studies supporting Sraffian challenge date back to the
late 1930s. While economists in Cambridge, England were dealing with solving the deficiencies of
Marshallian analysis of perfect competition during 1930s, a group of economists in Oxford headed
by Sir Huber Henderson pursued a series of empirical research between 1938-1940 based on surveys
with businessmen, reaching the conclusion “that the Marshallian framework was inconsistent with
the empirical evidence” (Lee 1981: 339). In more detail, this research showed that price decisions
of businessmen did not depend upon the state of demand whereas the effect of the interest rate on
their investment decisions was negligible (Lee 1981: 340). The definite fruit of this research was the
development of “full cost pricing and the kinked demand curve” (Lee 1981: 349), but unfortunately
the criticisms of the research group as to the Marshallian cross has not received due consideration by
academic scholars.
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paper a two-good production economy where individuals who face both production and
consumption decisions have demand schedules that are dependent on supply schedules.
In this simple environment, we aim to identify restrictions on the economic domain
that will ensure the coherence of the partial equilibrium analysis. Our results show
that many restrictions one can meaningfully propose to this end are ineffective. Inter-
estingly, we show that the conflict between the partial and general equilibrium analysis
can be resolved in environments with decreasing returns if the joint production possi-
bility is present and fixed costs of joint production are sufficiently small.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we introduce the
model and the problems with the Marshallian competitive analysis. After that, we
provide some explanations for the incoherence of the Marshallian thought experiment.
Then, we discuss several conjectures which fail to eliminate this incoherence and give
a remedy. Next, we give a brief account of how partial equilibrium analysis is accom-
modated in current reputable microeconomics textbooks. Finally, we present some
concluding remarks.
Model
We will consider a simple example of a market in which there is no equilibrium in the
sense that no configuration of prices will lead to a stable configuration of decentralized
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decisions. Our model allows the sole factor of production, land, to shift across indus-
tries. The existence of this possibility makes partial equilibrium analysis impossible,
as we demonstrate.
Suppose that there are 100 farmers each of whom owns a single plot of land of equal
size which is capable of growing either one unit of rice (R) or one unit of wheat (W )
but not both. Let us assume for simplicity that production takes place at zero fixed
cost. Each of these producers is also a consumer of W or R or both and has the utility
function U(W,R) = WR, satisfying standard assumptions.
We will now try to calculate the aggregate demand and supply functions in this
economy. Let us take wheat as the nume´raire, and set the price of wheat to one.
We will use p to denote the price of rice. The aggregate supply function of rice is
straightforwardly given by
SR(p) ∈

{0} if p < 1,
[0, 100] if p = 1,
{100} if p > 1.
(1)
If p > 1, then all farmers will produce rice, while if p < 1, then all will produce wheat.
If p = 1, then the farmers will have equal profits from producing either rice or wheat.
Nonexistence of Marshallian Market Demand Function
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Unlike the supply function, the thought experiment which defines the demand curve
is not clear in this example. We contemplate changing the price of rice and asking
consumers how much rice they would consume. However, the ceteris paribus assump-
tion cannot be fulfilled in this example.5 Since a representative consumer is also a
producer, changes in the price of rice will affect his production decision and hence his
income. So, we consider the following two cases separately:
A wheat farmer is somehow committed to producing wheat. In this case, his income
is one, and his budget constraint is W + pR = 1. Subject to this budget constraint,
the utility function U(W,R) is maximized at W ∗ = 1/2, and R∗ = 1/(2p).
A rice farmer is similarly committed to producing rice. In this case, his budget
constraint is W + pR = p, since his income is p - the thought experiment in which the
price of rice is altered cannot keep the income of the rice farmer constant. Maximizing
utility subject to this constraint, we find that R∗ = 1/2 and W ∗ = p/2.
What is the Marshallian aggregate demand function? This question cannot be
answered in this model, because the number of wheat and rice farmers is itself en-
dogenous. Nonetheless, let us fix the quantity of wheat and rice farmers; perhaps at
5This is a general problem with partial equilibrium analysis. Lee and Keen (2004: 188) write that
“The existence of collateral effects invalidates the ceteris paribus, partial equilibrium methodology
[...]”. In their footnote 29, they provide additional reference supporting theoretical, empirical and
methodological evidence against the law of demand.
13
historical levels. Let NW be the number of wheat farmers and NR be the quantity of
rice farmers. The demand for rice by each wheat farmer is 1/(2p), so the aggregate
demand will be NW/(2p). On the other hand, for each rice farmer the demand for rice
is 1/2, pure and simple; so the total aggregate demand for rice will be
DR(p) =
NR
2
+
NW
2p
. (2)
Using this hypothetic demand, we will now attempt to find a partial competitive
equilibrium.
A Symmetric Equilibrium
Because of the model’s complete symmetry in R and W , a natural equilibrium with
many demonstrable optimality properties is one in which there are 50 rice farmers and
50 wheat farmers, the two products have the same price and every farmer consumes
1/2 units of both wheat and rice. If NR = 50 and NW = 50, this desirable symmetric
equilibrium somehow emerges at a Marshallian cross at which the demand curve for
rice, obtained using (2), is given by the function DR(p) = 25 + 25/p for any p > 0,
intersecting the supply curve represented by (1) at p∗ = 1 and SR(p∗) = 50.
We want to know if this historical equilibrium will perpetuate itself. We announce
to the world that this is the best equilibrium - there will be 50 rice farmers and 50 wheat
farmers and prices of the two products will be equal. Let every farmer maximize his
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profit. Then every farmer is indifferent between growing rice and wheat and therefore
we cannot predict what output will emerge. That is, announcing the equilibrium prices
does not decentralize production decisions in the way that economic theory predicts.
Because the production decision is arbitrary, 70 farmers may decide to grow wheat and
30 to grow rice. Any set of decisions is ex-ante compatible with profit maximization.
There is no way to decentralize the production decisions and produce 50 units of wheat
and 50 of rice. If some arbitrary quantities are produced, like (70,30), then rice will be
more expensive and wheat less so. The wheat producers will suffer welfare loss, while
the rice farmers will gain. At any non-symmetric equilibrium, the gainers are fewer
than the losers, so that a ‘democratic’ equilibrium would be symmetric.
What will happen in the next period? If farmers are na¨ıve and believe that these
prices will continue, then they will all plant rice. This will lead to severely problematic
equilibria. Some partial and probabilistic adjustment mechanisms would lead towards
(50,50), the optimal equilibrium; but it can never be achieved and price fluctuations
will persist since there is no decentralized way to arrive at the symmetric equilib-
rium. Obviously, assuming rational expectations on the part of farmers would not help
matters, either.
The knife-edge equilibrium we have described above ties in and illustrates the con-
tention of Aslanbeigui and Naples (1997) that under conditions required for demand
and supply to exist, firm outputs are unstable, although the model, and the reasons
15
for the fluctuations are different.
An Incoherent Thought Experiment
At some level, it is clear that the general equilibrium story conflicts with the Marshal-
lian supply and demand. General equilibrium theory tells us that all markets are in
general interdependent, while Marshallian models seek to explain equilibrium in one
market without reference to what is happening in others. The above model of ours
shows that the conflict is much more dramatic than is realized. The concepts used in
a Marshallian model cannot even be defined within a general equilibrium framework.
One cannot explain equilibrium price formation within a market in isolation. Since
all our elementary textbooks rely on the Marshallian framework, and our intuitions
about equilibrium price and quantities are shaped by these textbooks, some radical
rethinking is required. The problem with the standard textbook argument is hidden
in the income “Y”. Our elementary micro models do not have money. Thus we cannot
consider a thought experiment in which we fix the income in nominal terms and ask
consumers what they would purchase. But any notion of real income must go through
prices, which are considered to be varying in constructing the demand.
Another explanation of the incoherence of the Marshallian thought experiment
in more general terms is as follows. The Marshallian framework takes tastes and
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technologies (represented by utility and production functions, respectively) as well as
factor costs as given, and produces equilibrium prices and quantities. The demand
function is based on asking the question: what would a consumer purchase if the price
of the good being purchased changed? This thought experiment is incoherent, because
within a Marshallian framework, a price cannot change. An endogenous variable can
only change when some exogenous variable does. In a Marshallian world, if I am
asked what I will do when the price changes, I must ask ‘why’ did the price change?
Being endogenous, prices are not free to change on their own. There are three possible
reasons, each of which has their own and different effects: i. prices changed because
of shifts in the supply function; ii. prices changed because of shifts in the demand
function; iii. there was some exogenous shock.
This last possibility is the one that is in the back of the mind of a partial equilib-
rium economist. However, exogenous shocks are delicate and subtle and require very
careful treatment. it is not enough to talk about exogenous shocks to prices; the exact
and specific nature of shock must be specified before we can ask about responses. In
particular, we must know whether or not this new price being quoted at us, in order
to elicit a demand, is a disequilibrium price resulting from a temporary or permanent
shock. To give a good response, we will need a lot more information about the na-
ture of the disequilibrium and also the mechanisms which come into effect following
disequilibrium. If it is an equilibrium price on the other hand, then ceteris paribus
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cannot hold, and we must know what other changes have occurred to cause this shift
in equilibrium. This means that the thought experiment required to define a Marshal-
lian demand function is internally incoherent or at least incomplete.
Several Conjectures and a Remedy
Responding to earlier drafts of this article, several economists presented conjectures
about conditions which would lead to the supply and demand framework holding as
an approximation in one of the submarkets in a general equilibrium economy. Five
conjectures are in order:
A conjecture (due to George Judge) is that if there was a large number of goods,
and the good in question was a small proportion of the total budget, then supply
and demand would be good approximation. In our model above, if we have n goods,
G1, G2, . . . , Gn any one of which can be produced by the farmers, and the utility
functions are the product of all consumptions, then the example goes through exactly
as before.
A second conjecture (due to Jeffrey M. Perloff) is that additively separable utility
functions were required. If U(R,W ) = W + R, then wheat and rice are in effect
identical goods and all production and consumption decisions are equivalent. Except
for this trivial special case, separable utilities do not help with the two problems that
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production decisions are endogenous and that varying the prices leads to variations in
the income.
A third conjecture (due to Debraj Ray) is that we need to separate the consumers
from the producers, to get the Marshallian framework. There are several levels of
separation possible, but none that we have tried could succeed in producing Marshallian
supply and demand. For example, we have tried the separation where the farms are
run by foreign firms which repatriate all profits to home countries (so variations in firm
income do not impact on the market) and do not hire domestic labor, while consumers
have their own endowments which they use to purchase rice and wheat from these
foreign producers.
As a fourth conjecture, one can argue that the conflict between the partial and
general equilibrium frameworks and the problem with defining a Marshallian demand
curve can be resolved if consumption, instead of consumers, is completely separated
from production. To disprove this claim, take a pure exchange economy with goods
x1, x2, . . . , xk. Suppose good one is nume´raire and let p2, . . . , pk be the price of the
others. Let e(j) = 〈e1(j), ..., ek(j)〉 be the endowment bundle of the jth consumer.
At any vector of prices p = 〈1, p2, ..., pk〉, let D(j, p) be the vector of demand of the
jth consumer. Consider the problem of defining a Marshallian demand curve for the
second good.
In the first instance, this can be done by varying p2, keeping all other prices fixed.
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Then we may have a well defined demand function for good 2, but it does not represent
the concept of Marshallian demand since incomes of all consumers would vary as p2 is
changed.
Alternatively, we may try the following. Let I(j) =
∑k
i=1 p
∗
i ei(j) be the income of
the consumer j at some fixed vector of prices p∗. Now ignore this origin of income and
fix this income as a number for each consumer. Ask consumer j to maximize utility
derived from the consumption vector 〈x1(j), x2(j), . . . , xk(j)〉 subject to the budget
constraint
∑k
i=1 pixi(j) ≤ I(j). This should be the Marshallian demand. The demand
function is now well-defined, but does not have anything to do with consumer j’s
behavior because it artificially fixed the value of his endowment vector e(j) at p∗.
One can finally argue that the incoherence of Marshallian competitive analysis
would vanish if the producers did not face constant returns to scale. To check this
last conjecture, we assume that each producer has a divisible labor endowment of one
unit as the single input of production, and a decreasing returns to scale technology6
represented by the production function f that converts any labor input L > 0 to the
output f(L) > 0. We assume that f ′(L) > 0 and f ′′(L) < 0 for all L > 0, and
f ′(0) = ∞. Let K ≥ 0 denote the fixed costs of producing any of the two goods
separately. We further assume that when joint production possibility is present, the
6We simply disregard the case of increasing returns to scale in which the general equilibrium usually
does not exist.
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fixed costs of producing wheat and rice jointly is K ′ ≥ 0.
We are now ready to present a positive result.
Proposition 1: The conflict between the partial and general equilibrium vanishes in
the described production economy with decreasing returns under sufficiently small val-
ues of fixed costs of joint production7 if the following two conditions both hold: i) the
joint production possibility is present, ii) the joint production of commodities is desir-
able at the market clearing price in the absence of any fixed costs.
Proof. Suppose the conditions in the hypothesis of the proposition hold. Then each
farmer will, by condition (i), jointly produce wheat and rice at any given price p > 0
if and only if
max
L∈[0,1]
{pf(L) + f(1− L)−K ′} = pf(Lˆ(p)) + f(1− Lˆ(p))−K ′
> max{pf(1)−K, f(1)−K}, (3)
where
pf ′(Lˆ(p)) = f ′(1− Lˆ(p)). (4)
At any price p > 0 where wheat and rice are jointly produced, the market supply of
7In situations, where fixed costs are doubled under joint production (K ′ = 2K), Proposition 1
would be valid when fixed costs of producing any good separately are sufficiently low.
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rice is
SR(p) = 100f(Lˆ(p)), (5)
whereas the market demand for rice is
DR(p) = 50f(Lˆ(p)) +
50f(1− Lˆ(p))
p
, (6)
by equation (2) and the fact that NW = 100f(1− Lˆ(p)).
Obviously, SR(.) is an upward sloping schedule by equation (4) and the assumption
that f is strictly concave. On the other hand, DR(.) is downward sloping since
dDR(p)
dp
= −50f(1− Lˆ(p))
p2
, (7)
using equation (4). Then, the unique price pˆ that clears the market for rice satisfies
pˆf(Lˆ(pˆ)) = f(1− Lˆ(pˆ)), (8)
which is obtained by equating (4) and (5).
By condition (ii), inequality (3) is satisfied at pˆ under the fixed costs (K ′, K) =
(0, 0); therefore we have pˆf(Lˆ(pˆ)) + f(1 − Lˆ(pˆ)) > max{pˆf(1), f(1)}. Now choose
K ′ = Kˆ ≥ 0 such that
Kˆ −K < pˆf(Lˆ(pˆ)) + f(1− Lˆ(pˆ))−max{pˆf(1), f(1)}. (9)
Thus, the inequality (3) is satisfied at pˆ under the fixed costs (Kˆ,K) of joint and
separate production of the two goods. 
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While the presence of decreasing returns and small fixed costs of joint production
does not cure the interdependency of the demand with the supply, it eliminates the
discontinuity of the supply curve around the equilibrium price, rendering the conven-
tional Marshallian cross, defined by an upward sloping supply curve (eqn. 5) and a
downward sloping demand curve (eqn. 6), stable around the equilibrium price. Heuris-
tically, we can argue that joint production joins the two industries into one, and solves
the problem of Sraffa by eliminating the possibility of shifting factors of production
from one industry to the other.
Partial Equilibrium Analysis in Current Microeconomic
Textbooks
A comprehensive study by Lee and Keen (2004) examined the coherence of neoclassical
microeconomic theory in 74 textbooks in the undergraduate or graduate level focusing
on many key subjects involving choices, preferences, utility functions, demand curves,
production, costs, factor input demand functions, partial equilibrium, perfect compe-
tition, and the supply curve. This study showed that the generality of the examined
textbooks handle these subjects incoherently or lack adequate empirical support. For
example, while the short or long run market supply is derived in all textbooks by the
horizontal aggregation of the individual firm supply curves, the underlying conditions
23
for successful aggregation, such as homothetic production functions and equality of
the input prices for the same factor input, are not mentioned. Neither, there exists a
reference to perverse supply curves when the output is among the factor inputs or to
collateral-effects the upward sloping market supply curve generates when production is
carried out by produced means of production. The conclusion of Lee and Keen (2004:
190) upon these observations was that “possible problems with consistent and repre-
sentational aggregation, perverse outcomes, and violation of the partial equilibrium
methodology clearly suggest that the market supply curve (both short and long run)
is a unsustainable theoretical concept” in microeconomic textbooks.8
Current textbook treatments of supply and demand based on Stigler and Samuel-
son have been strongly shaped by the debate introduced by Sraffa. Nonetheless, for
the most part, textbooks show very little awareness of this historical background, and
of the existing critiques of supply and demand framework. Below, we provide further
details, supporting the previous conclusions of Lee and Keen (2004) as to the gen-
eral ignorance of the potential problems with partial equilibrium analysis, based upon
our examination of a number of microeconomics textbooks assigned as primary class
material in many prestigious undergraduate or graduate programs in Economics9.
8A similar conclusion as to the accommodation of supply curves in current textbooks is reached
by Opocher and Steedman (2008a: 271) who argue that “the analytical foundations of the long-run
curves are not self-evident”.
9As anecdotal evidence, we may add that both authors went through graduate education without
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Of the three most reputable textbooks used in graduate programs, Varian (1992:
313) contains a single short paragraph to address the partial equilibrium model. The
textbook that devotes the lengthiest discussion on the partial equilibrium framework
is Mas-Colell et al (1995), where pages 316-43, nearly the whole tenth chapter, study
competitive and welfare analysis under partial equilibrium, while pages 538-40 discuss
using the tax incidence example of Bradford (1978) “how a na¨ıve application of partial
equilibrium analysis leads us seriously astray” Mas-Colell et al (1995: 538). Although
the book emphasizes in a number of places the significance of the assumed absence of
wealth effects and substitution effects for the validity of welfare analysis and competi-
tive analysis respectively, it contains no explicit account of the potential problems due
to supply side interdependencies. A brief, yet more balanced, discussion is available
in Kreps (1990), where a subsection (in pages 279-83) of the chapter that introduces
partial equilibrium analysis of perfect competition addresses two main problems with
partial equilibrium, namely the interdependencies between the demand curves of goods
that are substitutes and the interdependencies of the supply curves of goods using a
common factor of production.
receiving any hint of problems with or even any limitations on supply and demand framework – we
were taught to think that it was universally applicable to all markets. Informal surveys of recent
graduate students also show that they believe that price determination can be analyzed by breaking
up the economy into separate markets for each good, where the price of each good is determined in
its own separate market in isolation via forces of supply and demand.
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As the above discussion shows, some authors of graduate texts do show awareness of
problems with partial equilibrium supply and demand models. However, all of them do
so on the general grounds that this ignores potential interactions with other markets,
and not that there is a conflict between the PE story of price determination and the
GE version of the same story.
The ignorance of the problems with Marshallian competitive theory is significantly
more evident in undergraduate textbooks. For example, in Mansfield (1988: 439),
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2001: 565) and Varian (2002: 540) the reference to the partial
equilibrium model is confined to a couple of sentences. Nicholson (2002: 14) addresses
the distinction between the partial equilibrium and general equilibrium models, as
well as demand side and supply side interdependencies that require general equilib-
rium analysis. Similarly, an explicit but brief discussion on “when partial equilibrium
analysis will do” is available in a couple of paragraphs in Stiglitz and Walsh (2002:
216-7).
In an overall evaluation, while nearly a half of the most reputable textbooks in Mi-
croeconomics, especially those in the graduate level, address demand and supply side
interdependencies that would require a general - instead of a partial - equilibrium anal-
ysis, though only briefly and without any reference to the related literature grown up
in almost a century, the remaining half contains neither explicit nor implicit reference
to the potential problems with Marshallian cross, rendering Microeconomic teaching
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extremely biased in favour of partial equilibrium models. To give just one example of
the serious misunderstandings that result, we note that several textbooks discuss the
supply and demand of housing, and derive policy implications based on this partial
equilibrium analysis. Rent is a substantial portion of a typical household’s budget, and
variations in rent would have not only have substantial income effects, they would also
impact on all markets by increasing or decreasing income available. Nonetheless, none
of the elementary textbooks mention potential problems with a partial equilibrium
analysis, which could be seriously misleading.
Conclusions
The complexity of general equilibrium, where everything depends on everything
else, does not help us in understanding price formation. Marshall followed a standard
scientific strategy of dividing a complex problem into smaller components which could
be understood easily in isolation and combined to yield the answer to the bigger prob-
lem. Unfortunately, the two components are not independent of each other. There
are a large number of channels through which supply and demand interact with each
other. This makes supply and demand analysis unreliable. A large number of mislead-
ing results from supply and demand are discussed in the final section of Aslanbeigui
and Naples (1997).
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Our analysis provides a concrete demonstration of the incoherence of supply and
demand analysis in the context of a elementary economic model conforming to neoclas-
sical assumptions. We show on a simple model of production economy that the concepts
of Marshallian supply and demand can be in conflict with the general equilibrium, and
because of certain logical contradictions, these conflicts cannot be resolved for a ma-
jority of restrictions on economic environments. We are able to obtain a compatibility
result under decreasing returns and in the presence of joint production possibility pro-
vided that the fixed costs of joint production are sufficiently small. Looking from the
opposite angle, it is interesting to note that the failure of equilibrium problem studied
in this paper does not hinge upon the type of production technology that farmers em-
ploy, if the joint production possibility is absent or undesirable or if the fixed costs of
joint production are too large. Thus, in many economic environments the essence of
the matter may reduce to a coordination problem, and would generalize far beyond the
simple context discussed. At equilibrium, all activities bring equal profits, so entrants
can choose arbitrarily among different activities. But this leads to quantities being
indeterminate. An artificial solution can be created by allowing for joint production
under decreasing returns to scale and small fixed costs. Under suitable hypotheses, this
eliminates the coordination problem created by the indeterminacy of the profit maxi-
mizing production levels. But, then, in the situation described in the first conjecture
in the previous section, all farmers would produce all goods in identical proportions.
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This does not seem like a realistic scenario, and many plausible assumptions (such as
fixed costs, or constant returns to scale) can be used to rule it out. Thus the conflict
between the partial and general equilibrium models would appear to be generic and
widespread.
This study also shows that several intuitions of ours may not be justified even by
very simple models. Our intuitions as economists, and our policy advice, are based
on intuitions generated by the models we learn in universities. One of the simplest of
these is that there are competitive equilibria, and that markets achieve these equilibria.
Our very simple model does not have an equilibrium for a wide range of economic
restrictions. That is, there is no configuration of decentralized decisions which is self-
replicating and self-sustaining.
A second widely believed and strong intuition is that fixing prices above equilibrium
values would lead to a reduction in trades. The controversy about the Card and
Kreuger (1997) findings that minimum wages did not lead to increased unemployment
arose because it conflicts with this intuition. In an interview, Card stated that he
thought that elementary supply and demand models did not apply to the labor market,
as our analysis also suggests. He felt that more complex search theoretic frameworks
could explain their findings. The emotional attachment of economists to “supply and
demand” framework is reflected in Card’s (2006) statement that “[...] (economists)
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became very angry or disappointed.10 They thought that in publishing our work we
were being traitors to the cause of economics as a whole.”
A third intuition is that planning leads to inefficiencies. Suppose that in the model
described in Section 2 the government designates 60 people to be wheat farmers and
the rest to be rice farmers. This will be inefficient (as discussed earlier) but will lead
to a stable configuration with predictable incomes. Suppose Jeffrey Sachs comes in
and advises that transition to a free market will produce better results. Since farmers
cannot coordinate production decisions, chaos is likely to result. Different models
of farmers expectations regarding price formation will lead to different results, but
rational expectations cannot prevent substantial random variation in decision making
driven solely by maximization of profits. The uncertainty and random variations in
incomes generated by decentralized decision making would lead to substantial loss of
efficiency relative to the planned economy.
Sraffa (1925, 1926) argued that partial equilibrium ideas we use in elementary text-
books today to explain formation of prices in markets are only applicable under very
restrictive assumptions. Our example illustrates in a very simple model that inter-
actions between demand and supply are ubiquitous, and even render the concept of
demand function un-intelligible. The vast majority of current textbooks assume that
10“Interview with David Card.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, The Region, December 1,
2006. http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications papers/pub display.cfm?id=3190
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Marshallian supply and demand is automatically applicable to all markets. Given the
centrality of this concept in economics, research on conditions for the validity of this
approximation would be a high priority. Preliminary results by Hayashi (2009) and
Vives (1987) in this direction show that very stringent conditions are needed. Even
these results only establish the possibility of obtaining a Marshallian demand func-
tion for a single consumer - the requirements for being able to aggregate this demand
would be even more restrictive, and are not addressed. Instead of attempting to derive
a theory of price from assumptions of maximization for consumers and firms, a more
promising approach appears to be more empirically oriented. Behavioral economics
has made significant advances in explaining consumer behavior as well as financial
anomalies. Similarly empirical examination of how prices are set by firms, as reviewed
in Lee (2011), provides a promising alternative to neoclassical theories of price forma-
tion.
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